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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
A. PHARIS JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
DAVID BANKHEAD, Auditor of 
Tooele County, Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case No. 7667 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, as county attorney of Tooele County, brought 
this action to get a judicial declaration that as a matter of 
law he was and is entitled to the sum of $3500 per year as 
the maximum salary allowed for the office of attorney in 
counties of the second class under the provisions of Section 
19-13-14, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 
34, Laws of Utah 1945, rather than the sum of $1800 per year, 
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the salary fixed for that office by the board of commissioners 
of Tooele County, and also to receive the difference for the 
years 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950. 
Because the issues involve matters of vital public con-
cern, and raise certain constitutional questions as well as the 
fact that the plaintiff, as county attorney of Tooele County, 
has an interest in the matter adverse to that of other county 
officials, the Attorney General, at the request of the Auditor 
of Tooele County, has undertaken to represent the defendant. 
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the 
grounds that it did not state a claim against defendant upon 
which relief could be granted, and also because it failed to 
join certain indispensible parties. Upon argument of the 
motion it was stipulated that the matter go immediately to 
pre-trial, and upon pre-trial it was stipulated that the issues 
be narrowed to the following questions of law: 
( 1) Can the county commissioners of a county fix a 
salary for a county officer at a figure less than the maximum 
shown in Section 19-13-14, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
amended? 
(2) If the answer to the above is "No," then can plaintiff 
recover additional salary for the years 1947, 1948, 1949, and 
1950, or for any part thereof? 
Upon the formulation of these issues, each party moved 
for judgment on the pre-trial order and after argument the 
court denied plaintiff's motion, granted defendant's motion 
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It is from this 
order that plaintiff appeals. 
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It was stipulated by and between the parties, and so set 
forth in the pre-trial order that the plaintiff is and ever since 
January, 1947, has been the county attorney of Tooele County, 
that during all of this time Tooele County was a county of 
the second class, and that plaintiff's salary as county attorney 
as fixed by the board of county commissioners for the year 
1946 and subsequently has been the sum of $1800 per year. 
No issue has been raised as to any technical defects in the 
action of the board of commissioners in fixing the annual 
salary of plaintiff, as county attorney, at $1800 as was the 
situation in the case of .Nliller v. White, 70 U 145, 258 Pac. 565 
and Price t'. Tuttle, 70 U 156, 258 Pac. 1016. Abuse of dis-
cretion by the Board of County Commissioners in fixing the 
sum of $1800 per year as the salary for the county attorney 
is not an issue in the appeal of this case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The action of the board of county commissioners of 
Tooele County in fixing the salaries for the various 
county officers was proper and in accordance with the 
constitution and laws of the state. 
II. If the action of the board of county commissioners of 
Tooele County in fixing the salaries of the various 
county officers was not authorized, then the plaintiff, 
as county attorney, is not entitled to a salary because 
none has been prescribed. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE ACTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COM-
MISSIONERS OF TOOELE COUNTY IN FIXING THE 
SALARIES FOR THE V ARlO US COUNTY OFFICERS WAS 
PROPER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND LAWS OF THE STATE. 
It is generally recognized that in the absence of some con-
stitutional prohibition or limitation the power or duty to fix 
the compensation of county officers may be vested in the gov-
erning body of the county. See 43 Am. Jur. 138, where a con-
cise statement of the general rule is as follows: 
The power to fix the compensation of public of-
fivers is not inherently and exclusively legislative in 
character. Unless the Constitution expressly or im-
pliedly prohibits the legislature from doing so, it may 
delegate the power to other governmental bodies or 
officers, as, for example, to the governor, to counties, 
to cities, to courts or judges, or to other officers or 
official boards. 
Also, in 20 CJS 917 the general rule is said to be: 
Subject to any limitations imposed by the state con-
stitution, the power or duty to fix the compensation of 
county officers or agents may be vested in the county 
board or similar body, and in some jurisdictions, com-
pensation· or salaries not fixed by law should be fixed 
by the county board. 
It is respectfully submitted that appellant, in citing various 
cases in his brief to the effect that the legislature alone is 
authorized by the constitution to fix salaries of county officers, 
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and that an attempted delegation of this power is of no force 
and effect, has failed to note the differences in the constitu~ 
tional provisions of the various states. The Arizona cases 
cited by the plaintiff involve an interpretation of section 4 
of Article 12 of the Constitution of the State of Arizona pro-
viding as follows: 
* * * The board of supervisors of each county is 
hereby empowered to fix salaries for all county and 
precinct officers within such county for whom no com-
pensation is prouided by law, and the salaries so fixed 
shall remain in full force and effect until changed by 
law. (Italics added.) 
The power of the board of supervisors to fix salaries under 
this section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of 
Arizona as being temporary and exercisable only during the 
period between admission to statehood and proper action by 
the state legislature. See Patty v. Greenlee County, 14 Ariz. 
422, 130 Pac. 757; Hunt v. l\1ohave County, 18 Ariz. 480, 162 
Pac. 600; Santa Cruz County v. McKnight, 20 Ariz. 103, 177 
Pac. 256, Board of Supvs v. Stephens, 20 Ariz. 115, 177 Pac. 
261; State Consol. Pub. tJ. Hill, 39 Ariz. 21, 3 P 2d525; and 
Ross v. Cochise County, 20 Ariz. 167, 177 Pac. 931. 
The applicable constitutional provision of the State of 
Utah in section 1, Article XXI, does not provide that the com-
pensation of county officers shall be rrprovided by law" as 
does the provision of the Arizona constitution, but merely that 
"All * * * county officers * * * shall be paid fixed and 
definite salaries * * . " The constitution of the State of Utah 
on the other hand does provide in section 10, Article VIII that 
" * * * The powers and duties of County Attorneys * * * shall 
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be prescribed by law." (Italics added.) However, it is the 
salary and not the powers and duties of the county attorney 
with which we are concerned in this case. Furthermore, 
Burgess v. Apache County, 20 Ariz. 140, 177 Pac. 269; Graham 
County v. Alger, 20 Ariz. 147, 177 Pac. 272; and Graham 
County v. Smith, 20 Ariz. 145, 177 Pac. 271; cited by the 
appellant are not in point at all because they deal with the 
statute of limitations applicable to a claim for back salaries 
of officers rather than the question of the delegation of power 
to fix the salaries. 
Again, in the California cases cited by appellant, the 
courts were dealing with a constitutional provision entirely 
different from the one in the State of Utah. Section 5, Article 
XI of the Constitution of the State of California provides: 
The legislature, by general and uniform laws, shall 
provide for the election or appointment, in the several 
counties, of * *. * and such other county, township, 
and municipal officers as public convenience may re-
quire, and shall prescribe their duties and fix their 
term of office. It shall regulate the compensation of 
all such officer.r * * * . (Italics added.) 
In interpreting the above quoted constitutional provisions in 
Arnold v. Sullenger, 200 Cal. 632, 254 Pac. 267, which held 
invalid an attempt to delegate to the board of supervisors the 
power to fix the compensation of the county surveyor, the 
Supreme Court of California had this to say: 
Section 5 of Article 11 of the Constitution provides 
that the Legislature by general and uniform law shall 
"regulate the compensation of all such officers," which 
includes county officers. * * * An examination of 
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the cases in this state, and particularly those above 
cited, clearly indicates that the word "regulate" has 
always been deemed to mean "to fix" or "to establish," 
and no other signification may now properly be attach-
ed to that word in the connection in which it is so em-
ployed in this section of the Constitution. 
Thus, because of the vast differences in constitutional pro-
visions, the California cases likewise are of no help to ap-
pellant in support of his unqualified assertion that the legisla-
ture alone is authorized by the constitution to fix salaries of 
county officers and that an attempted delegation of this power 
is of no force and effect. The cases cited by appellant are 
in line with those wherein constitutional provisions require the 
legislature to prescribe the compensation of .county officers and 
the courts uniformly hold that under such provisions the 
legislature cannot delegate its power to any individual, officer 
or board. See also in this connection section 27, Article 3 
of the constitution of the State of Florida wherein it is pro-
vided "The Legislature shall provide for the election * * * 
of all state and county officers * * * and fix by law their duties 
and compensation." And Section 4, Article 16 of the Con-
stitution of Arkansas wherein it is provided that "The General 
Assembly shall fix the salaries and fees of all officers in the 
state * * * " together with the cases of State v. Spencer, 81 
Fla. 211, 87 So. 634 and Pulaski County v. Caple, 191 Ark. 
340, 86 SW 2d 4, interpreting those constitutional provisions. 
Where there are no constitutional prohibitions or limita-
tions, as is the case in the State of Utah, the power and duty 
to fix the compensation of county officers may be and is gen-
erally delegated to the governing body of the county. In addi-
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tion to the general authorities cited above, see also Huffaker 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 54 Idaho 715, 35 P 2d 261; 
Dygert v. Board of Commissioners of Caribou County, 64 Idaho 
161, 129 P 2d 660; Reynolds v. Board of Comm'rs., 6 Idaho 
787, 59 Pac. 7~·0; Dew v. Ashley County, 199 Ark. 361, 133 
SW 2d 652, citing RCL; State v. Nolte, 351 Mo. 271, 172 
SW 2d 854; Arnett v. State, 168 Ind. 180, 80 NE 153, 8 LRA 
(NS) 1192; Throckmorton County v. Thompson, 131 Tex. 
543, 115 SW 2d 1102; Sarlis v. State, 201 Ind. 88, 166 NE 
270, 67 ALR 718; State v. Darby, 345 Mo. 1002, 137 SW 2d 
532; Coleman v. Jackson County, 349 Mo. 255, 160 SW 2d 
691; Stephens v. Mills County (Tex. Civ. App.) 113 SW 2d 
944; Nacogdoches County v. Winder (Tex. Civ. App.) 140 
sw 2d 972. 
It is also generally held that the power to pay salaries 
not exceeding a certain prescribed maximum necessarily im-
plies the power to pay less than the prescribed maximum. In 
Coleman v. Jackson, 349 Mo. 255, 160 SW 2d 691, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri said: 
The last clause of the quoted portion of the section 
forbidding the court to pay such county employees 
more than the rates fixed by statute obviously implies 
the power to pay them less than the statutory rate 
* * * 
In Stephens v. Mills County (Tex. Civ. App.) 113 SW 
2d 944, the Supreme Court of Texas had this to say: 
The language is also within the rule announced by 
the decisions, that the commissioners' court may fix 
the maximum fees to be returned by the county treas-
urer at a sum less than the statutory maximum * * * ." 
10 
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Also in Throckmorton County v. Thompson, 131 Tex. 543, 
115 SW 2d 1102, the Supreme Court of Texas said: 
The order of the commissioners' court fixing the 
compensation of the County Treasurer of Throckmor-
ton County on a commission basis for a maximum 
amount o{ less than that fixed by a statute is a valid 
exercise of authority conferred on such court by the 
Constitution and statutes of this state. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho in Reynolds v. Board of 
Comm~rs., 6 Idaho 787, 59 Pac. 730, upheld the action of the 
Board of Commissioners even though it felt the board had 
fixed the salaries in question extremely low. In the course 
of its opinion the court had this to say about the amount 
of compensation to be paid county officers: 
It is not the policy of the law, the wish of the 
people, or in the interest of public economy that 
the compensation of county officials should be 
placed on a niggardly footing, totally inadequate 
to the decent administration of public affairs. Neither 
is it the policy that these officials should be al-
lowed extravagant salaries, beyond all reason. But 
the intention of the legislature was that the boards 
of county commissioners in the various counties should 
take into consideration the work and time consumed 
in the various offices, the expense connected with the 
same, the self -sustaining revenue therefrom, the re-
sponsibilities attached thereto, the bonds under which 
the parties are placed, and all the circumstances and 
conditions connected therewith, and from all these 
determine what would be a proper and just compen-
sation for their services. 
In holding that the exercise of discretion of the board of com-
missioners in fixing the salaries of county officers is not sub-
11 
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jete to review except in those cases when a clear abuse of dis-
cretion is shown, that same court had this to say in Huffaker 
v. Board of County Commissioners, 54 Idaho 715, 3·5 P 2d 
261: 
The responsibility of determining a just and suffi-
cient salary, taking into consideration the laudable 
desire for legitimate economies, adequate service to 
the county and public, just compensation to the em-
ployee and due regard for the rights and interest of 
the taxpayer, rests on the board, subject to control by 
the courts for abuse, and the evidence herein does not 
show the board has in this case overstepped the bounds 
of a reasonable discretion. 
In the case of Hall et al v. Beveridge, 81 Ill. Rep. 128, 
Section 10 of Article 10 of the constitution of 1870 of the 
State of Illinois, authorized the county board to fix the 
salaries of county officers at not more per annum than $1500 
in counties not exceeding 20,000 inhabitants; $2,000 in coun-
ties between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants; and $2500 in 
counties between 30,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. In a county 
containing more than 30,000 and not exceeding 50,000 in-
habitants, the board had fixed the clerk's salary at $1500. It 
was contended that the board had no lawful authority to fix 
the salary at less than $2,000 and hence the action of the board 
was void. The contention in that case is similar to the conten-
tion inferred by the appellant in this case. In disposing of 
the matter, however, the Supreme Court had this to say about 
the power of the board to fix the salary of the clerk: 
No minimum is imposed by the express words ot 
the section, and we find nothing in the section from 
which it can properly be regarded as implied. Full 
12 
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power to fix the compensation of county officers is 
given to the county board, with certain limitations ex-
pressed in the section. We find nothing in these limi-
tations forbidding the fixing of the salary of this clerk 
at $1500. 
In view of the constitutional provision in section 10, 
Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah, providing 
that 
* * * The powers and duties of County Attorneys, 
and such other attorneys for the State as the Legisla-
ture may provide, shall be prescribed by law. * * * 
appellant urges that the county attorney is a state rather than 
a county officer and that his salary must, therefore, be fixed by 
the State Legislature. However, the Constitution does not 
so provide and section 19-13-2 Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
provides as follows: 
The officers of a county are: Three county com-
missioners, a county treasurer, a sheriff, a county clerk, 
a county auditor, a county recorder, a county attorney, 
a county surveyor, a county assessor, and such others 
as may be provided by law; provided, that in counties 
having an assessed valuation of less than $20,000,000 
the county clerk shall be ex officio auditor of the county 
and shall perform the duties of such office without 
extra compensation therefor. (Italics added.) 
It is respectfully submitted that the county attorney is a "county 
officer," rather than a "state officer," who by performing his 
duties, serves the state as well as the county. In this connec-
tion see Ogle vs. Eckel, 49 Cal. App. 2d 599; 12 P 2d 67; Pelaez 
v. State, 107 Fla. 50, 144 So. 364; Clark vs. Tracy, 95 Iowa, 410 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
IF THE ACTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF TOOELE COUNTY IN FIXING 
THE SALARIES OF THE VARIOUS COUNTY OFFICERS 
WAS NOT AUTHORIZED, THEN THE PLAINTIFF, AS 
COUNTY ATTORNEY, IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SAL-
ARY BECAUSE NONE HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED. 
Respondent respectfully submits that Section 19-13-14 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 34, Laws 
of Utah 1945, is not a legislative declaration fixing the sal-
aries of the officers of all counties in the state, but is merely 
authorization for the respective boards of county commissioners 
to fix the said salaries at not to exceed the prescribed maxi-
mums. Should it therefore be determined that the board of 
County Commissioners of Tooele County had no authority to 
fix the salary of appellant as county attorney under the afore-
said statutory provisions, he would be entitled to none because 
none had been prescribed, and it is the universally recognized 
rule that unless compensation is by law attached to the office, 
none can be recovered by the officer holding such office. 43 
Am. Jur. 134-5; 46 CJ 1014, 1015; Mecham on Public Offic-
ers, Sections 855, 856, p. 577; Throop on Public Officers, Sec. 
446, p. 432. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the action of the board 
of county commissioners of Tooele County in fixing the salary 
14 
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of appellant as county attorney at a figure less than the maxi-
mwn prescribed by the ptovisions of Section 19-13-14, as 
amended, for the office of attorney in a county of the second 
class was proper and in conformity with the Constitution and 
Statutes of the State of Utah. The order of the district court 
on pre-trial granting defendant's motion for dismissal of the 
complaint, and dismissing the complaint with prejudice, should 
therefore be affirmed with costs to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON, 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
15 
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